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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15744 
RONALD JOHN MARTINEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Ronald John Martinez, was charged 
with the crime of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute for value in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LONER COURT 
The appellant was tried by a jury before the 
Honorable Dean E. Conder, in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The appellant 
was found guilty, and appeals that conviction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent seeks an affirmance of the result 
below. Sponsored by th  S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant was initially stopped by Deputy 
George and Deputy Anderson while in his car at about 
3900 South and 900 West in Salt Lake City (T.13), on 
July 18, 1977, at about 7:30 p.m. (T.50). The appellant 
was advised that the officers had a warrant to search 
his person and his residence, and was informed of his 
Miranda rights (T. 51). At that time the appellant was 
searched (T. 51), and was advised that the officers were 
going to search his residence, and that the appella~ 
could accompany them to the residence. The appellant 
was also informed that force would be used to gain 
entrance to the residence if necessary (T.51). 
The appellant testified that he was arrested 
at the time his car was stopped by the officers (T.159). 
The appellant accompanied the officers to his 
residence at 1158 Warbler (T.13). At that point, 
Deputies Anderson and George, the appellant and his 
wife (T.13,14), Detectives Duncan and Alexander, 
Special Deputy Akins, and Sergeant Patience were present 
in the home (T.12). The officers began a systematic 
search of the house (T.14), and located a blender, a 
suspected container of heroin, a cutting edge, a quarter 
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teaspoon measure (T.14,15), an aluminum funnel (T.21), 
a package of toy balloons (T.24), a strainer {T.25), 
and two packages of lactose (T.27). After the suspected 
heroin was discovered at about 7:50 p.m., the. appellant 
was placed under arrest (T.29). At this time, Deputy 
George asked the appellant if he understood his Miranda 
rights as they had been read to him at the time he was 
stopped in his car (T.31). The appellant replied 
affirmatively, and agreed to answer some questions {T.31). 
After the appellant had answered several questions 
(T.34,35), Deputy George testified that on his own the 
appellant blurted out, "yes, I deal dope, but I sold 
my last bag last night. If you find any dope here, 
you planted it." (T.35). 
The Chief Toxicologist for Salt Lake City, 
Donald Gunderson, testified that the substance found 
in the appellant's home was 6.4 grams (T.96) of 4.3 percent 
heroin (T.101). Deputy George testified that in Salt 
Lake City, heroin sold on the street ranged from one to 
two percent, with most of it being one percent {T.60,61). 
George testified that a balloon of heroin would contain 
approximately one quarter gram of substance {T.76), and 
that the amount of heroin found in the house would be 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
enough for 104 doses of street quality heroin (T.77). 
Deputy George testified further that all of the 
paraphernalia found, including the balloons, was 
located together in the kithcen cupboard directly 
opposite the cupboard in which the heroin was found 
(T.78). 
The appellant testified that at the time 
of his arrest both he and his wife were using heroin 
(T .152, 154), and that their combined usage ranged from 
ten to eighteen bags per day (T.155). 
Deputy George testified that of the several 
hundred addicts he knew that it was uncommon for them 
to have a supply of heroin on hand (T. 42), and that in 
Salt Lake City it was corrunon for the purchaser to be 
forced to use the heroin at the time of purchase (T.43). 
Jack Burdette, a defense witness, testified that the 
most heroin he had ever been able to purchase at one 
time was two spoons, or the equivalent of eight balloons 
(T.132). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT IvAS ADEQUATELY ADVISED 
OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS. 
The testimony at trial incl.i.cates that the 
-4-
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appellant was initially stopped by the authorities in 
an automobile stop at about 7:30 p.m. on July 18, 1977 
(T.50). At that time the appellant was advised by 
Deputy George that he had the right to remain silent, 
that anything he said could and would be used against 
him in a court of law, that he had the right to an 
attorney during questioning, and that if he was unable 
to afford an attorney one would be appointed by the court 
without cost (T.30). At that time the appellant indicated 
that he understood his rights (T.30). 
At trial, there was some question as to whether 
the appellant was free to go after the authorities searched 
him at his car (T.52); however, he was advised that they 
would search his residence whether he was there or not 
(T.52). The appellant testified that he was placed under 
arrest at the time the car was stopped (T.159). 
The appellant in fact accompanied the officers 
to his home (T.52), and Deputy George testified that he 
was placed under arrest at about 7:50 p.m. on the 18th 
of July, about 20 minutes after he was initially stopped 
(T.31). At this time, Deputy George again asked the 
appellant if he understood his rights (T.31). The 
appellant said that he did, and answered several questions. 
-5-
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The argument raised by the appellant is that 
the Miranda warning was not given subsequent to the time 
the appellant was placed under arrest by Deputy George 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 3-9), and that the statement, "yes,, 
I deal dope," allegedly made by the appellant was admittec 
into evidence in violation of his Miranda rights. 
A. 
THE APPELLANT WAS UNDER THE 
CONTINUUING CUSTODY OF THE 
AUTHORITIES FROM THE TIME HE 
WAS STOPPED IN HIS CAR UNTIL 
THE TIME THE INCRIMINATING 
STATEMENT WAS MADE. 
The trial court ruled that the appellant wu 
sufficiently "restrict (ed) of his freedom to render hfo 
in custody" at the time he was stopped in his car. In 
effect, the court distinguished the case at hand from 
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977), in which the 
United States Supreme Court noted that "Miranda warnings 
are required only where there has been such a restriction 
on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody'," rn , 
U.S. at 4 9 5, and held that interviews conducted in police ' 
stations are not inherently coercive. 
The question of how much restriction is require: 
to create an "in custody" situation has been addressedon' 
on numerous occasions by the courts. In State v. Paz, 
-6-
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31 Or.App. 851, 572 P.2d 1036 (1977), the court noted: 
"A difficulty arises as to whether 
this restraint should be measured in an 
objective or subjective manner. The 
objective manner would look to how the 
various circumstances surrounding an 
interrogation might affect a reasonable 
person, while the subjective manner would 
look to whether a particular interrogated 
defendant believed himself to be in 
custody ••• The majority of the courts 
have chosen the objective test." 572 
P.2d at 1040. 
The Oregon court relied on an earlier decision, State v. 
Evans, 241 Or. 567, 407 P.2d 621 (1965), to set forth the 
following criteria to determine whether a person is "in 
custody": 
" ••• a person is in custody if 
there is • • • some element of police 
control and consequent inhibition on 
freedom of movement, some circumstance, 
or some word or action on the part of the 
police that can be reasonably construed as 
physical or psychological restraint •••• " 
(EI'lphasis original.) 572 P.2d 1041. 
In State v. Kennedy, 116 Ariz. 566, 570 P.2d 
5~8 (1977), the court stated: 
"Custody is an objective condition. 
The subjective intent of the interrogator 
to arrest the suspect is not, in itself, 
a sufficient basis upon which to conclude 
that custody exists. [Citation omitted.] 
When an arrest has not yet taken place, 
the factors to be considered in deciding 
whether the custody has attached are many. 
Among the most important are (1) the site 
of the interrogation; (2) whether the 
investigation has focused on the suspect; 
-7-
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(3) whether the objective indicia of 
arrest are present; and (4) the length 
and form of the interrogation." 540 p 2d 
at 511. • 
....-
I 
Although Paz and Kennedy are factually unrelated I, 
to the case at hand, they nevertheless set forth valM 
criteria with which to determine the "in custody" iss'Je, 
The testimony in the case at hand indicates that 
the appellant was stopped by the authorities while drivin, 
his car (T.13), that he was searched (T.51,52), advised 
why he was stopped (T.13), and told that the officffs 
possessed a search warrant for his residence (T.13). 
He was also advised of his Miranda rights. Although he 
was asked if he wanted to accompany the officers back 
to his residence (T.13), he was advised that force wooN 
be used to gain entrance if necessary (T.52). 
objective test, it makes no difference whether 
Under the 
the officers \ 
considered the appellant to be "in custody" at this time, 
since the determination hinges on whether a reasonable man 
would consider himself in custody. Under the ~ test, 
it is clear that there was some "consequent inhibition of 
control" and some action that could "reasonably be 
construed as physical or psychological restraint." 
11 t Stopped l. n hi' s car, which is though the appe an was 
not customarily a coercive environment, the manner in which\ 
-8-
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he was stopped, and the threat of resort to violent 
entry to his home was adequate to lead appellant to 
conclude that he was "in custody." 
In United States v. DiGiacomo, 579 F.2d 1211 
(10th Cir. 1978), the Tenth Circuit determined that 
when a defendant had been (1) separated from a companion 
in his car, (2) simultaneously confronted by four 
officers, (3) told he was suspected of passing counter-
feit money, (4) told to surrender counterfeit money in 
his possession, and (5) given the choice between inunediate 
arrest and "voluntary" appearance the next day, the action 
of the officers was "functionally equivalent to an arrest," 
579 F.2d at 1214, and that a Miranda warning was necessary. 
The DiGiacomo criteria closely parallel the circumstances 
surrounding the automobile stop in the instant case. 
If the subjective approach is used to determine 
whether or not the appellant was "in custody," the 
appellant's own testimony at trial that he was placed 
under arrest at the time he was stopped (T.159), is 
dispositive of the issue. Indeed, the appellant's 
testimony may indicate that he was actually placed under 
arrest at the time he was stopped. 
-9-
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B 
THE CLOSE PROXIMITY BETWEEN 
THE TIME THE APPELLANT WAS 
STOPPED AND THE TIME THE 
STATEMENT WAS MADE OBVIATED 
THE NEED FOR A SECOND MIRANDA 
WARNING. 
The appellant was stopped in his car at about 
7: 30 p.m. (T. 50), and less than one half hour later 
he made the allegedly inadmissible statement. Immediately 
prior to the time he made the statement, Deputy George 
asked him if he understood his rights (T.31). This served 
to remind appellant that the rights were available to him 
and that the officers were cognizant of those rights. 
In State v. Lenon, 570 P.2d 901 (Mont. 1977), 
the defendant was arrested for possession of dangerous 
drugs and taken to jail. He was advised of his ~ 
rights at about 3:00 a.m. At 9: 00 a.m. the same morning, 
without a subsequent warning having been given, the 
defendant executed a statement in response to police 
questions. The Court stated: 
"Such a brief time lapse between 
the verbal warning and the- confession 
did not by itself, under the facts of 
this case, create a duty to verbally 
repeat those warnings ••• Rather, 
defendant gave every indication that 
he understood his rights when he told 
Officer Hossack on the morning of the 
confession that he did not want to call 
-10-
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a lawyer. Under the 'totality of the 
circumstances,' the defendant understood 
his rights, confessed voluntarily, and 
there was no need to repeat the Miranda 
warning." 570 P.2d at 907. 
In State v. Pyle, 216 Kan. 423, 532 P.2d 
1309 (1975), the defendant was charged with murder 
of his grandmother. On one occasion prior to his 
arrest, the defendant, subsequent to being advised 
of his rights, was interviewed by two state agents. 
During the course of the interview, the defendant attempted 
suicide by taking an overdose of drugs. After being taken 
to the hospital he confessed to the crime. On appeal, the 
defendant contended that the confession was involuntary 
because it was not immediately preceded by a warning as to 
his rights. The Kansas Court rejected the argument: 
"There is no merit to this contention. 
Just three hours earlier he had been given 
a concededly complete warning in his 
attorney's office ••• Once a suspect is 
fully advised of his rights and understands 
them, it is not necessary to give repeated 
Miranda warnings each time he is interviewed." 
532 P.2d at 1321. 
The State submits that the appellant was in 
custody from the time he was stopped in his car, and 
that he was advised timely of his Miranda rights. In 
addition, the close proximity in time between the initial 
warning and the subsequent statement eliminated the need 
for a second warning. 
-11-
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POINT II 
ASSUMI~JG, ARGUENDO, THAT THE 
MIRANDA WARNING HAS NOT GIVEN 1 
TIMELY, Tl'E STATEMENT COMPLAINED 
OF IS ADMISSIBLE AS A SPONTA'.JEOUS 
DECLARATION. 
Deputy George testified that subsequent t 1 
o p acing 
the appellant under arrest at his home and asking him if he 
•1nderstood his Miranda rights, he asked the appellant a 
few questions (T. 31). 
"Then without any question asked 
by anyone, the Deputies or any Pro-
vocation on 0ur part, the suspect just 
blurted out to us he said, yes--he 
said yeah, I deal dope, but I sold 
my last bag last night. If you find 
any dope here, you planted it." 
(T. 35) .. 
The Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (19 6 6) , promulgated sever al important 
guidelines for the protection of the rights of a suspect and 
yet left unchanged an area that is relevant to the instant 
case. 
"In dealing with statements obtained 
through interrogation, we do not purport 
to find all confessions inadmissible. 
Confessions remain a proper element in 
law enforcement. Any-statement given 
freely and voluntarily without any 
compelling influences is, of course, 
admlssible in evidence." 384 U.S. at 478. 
The conduct of the officers in the instant case 
f . The circumstances preserved an atmosphere free _rom coercion. 
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surrounding the event point to a spontaneous, voluntary 
statement: petitioner was not placed in an interviewing room 
or any confining area; no appreciable amount of time passed 
between his apprehension and the statement; no deception or 
trickery was used; in sum, all elements of the so-called 
"third degree" were missing. 
In State v. Easthope, 29 Utah 2d 400, 510 P.2d 933 
(1973), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"It was he who initiated the further 
conversation. . .. He voluntarily 
made the response of which he now 
complains. The orivilege against 
self-incrimination does not protect 
an accused against statements he 
voluntarily makes after he has been 
informed of his rights." 29 Utah 2d at 404. 
In Easthope, supra, the defendant agreed to participate in 
a lineup. Prior to the lineup, he was advised of his 
Miranda rights. The defendant was identified as the assailant 
and placed under arrest, and was reminded of his rights. 
He then asked the basis for his arrest, and was advised that 
he had been identified in the lineup. The defendant then 
remarked that he did not see how he could be identified 
with a silk stocking over his face. It was this statement 
he sought to suppress. 
The facts in Easthope parallel those in the instant 
case, and the standard of voluntariness shoula be applied 
in the instant case. 
-13-
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POINT III 
THE FAILURE OF THE OFFICER TO 
ADVISE APPELLANT OF HIS RH~HT 
TO STOP QUESTIONING \'IAS NOT A 
VIOLATION OF HIS FIFTH AMENDMENT 
OR MIRANDA RIGHTS. 
In Miranda v. Arizona, supr.a, the court held that: 
. . . an individual held for 
interrogation must be clearly 
informed that he has the right to 
consult with a lawyer and to have 
the lawyer with him during inter-
rogation under the system for pro-
tecting the privilege we delineate 
today. As with the warnings of the 
right to remain silent and that 
anything stated can be used in evidence 
against him, this warning is an absolute 
prerequisite to interrog?tion. No 
amount of circumstantial evidence that 
the person may have been aware of this 
right will suffice to stand in its 
stead." 86 S.Ct. at 1626. 
The court continued: 
"Once warnings have been given, the 
subsequent J)rocedure is clear. If 
the individual indicates in any manner, 
at any time prior to or during questioning, 
that he wishes to remain silent, the 
interrogation must cease." 
It is clear from Miranda itself that the need to 
advise the party of his right to cease answering questions is 
not mandatory. 384 U.S. 473-474. 
In United States v. DiGiacomo, supra, the 
government argued that Miranda imnosed no obligation 
-14-
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excressly advise suspects they can terminate questioning 
at any time. The court replied: 
"Although there may be no excress 
requirement to warn suspects of the 
right to terminate questioning, the 
government's failure to so warn is 
certainly an important factor to be 
considered in determining the 
voluntariness of any statements 
made." 579 F.2d at 1214. 
This position is virtually identical to the one enumerated 
by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Mosely, 423 u.s. 96 
(1975), and referred ~o by the appellant in his brief at 
pages 10 and 11. 
Whether appellant's right to cut off questioning 
was violated hinges not on whether he was advised of the 
right, but on whether his "right to cut off questioning" was 
in fact "scrupulously honored." 423 U.S. 105. 
In the instant case, there is no evidence that this 
right was violated. The appellant indicated his willingness 
to respond to questions (T. 31). He was asked enly five 
or six questions, and furthermore, the comment he seeks to 
have suppressed was not made in response to any question,. but 
was snontaneously made (T. 34,35). 
Appellant's submission in his brief (page 11) 
thct his right to cut off questioning is not honored unless 
-15-
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he is advised of the right is entirely unsupported by case 
law, and indeed rejected by Miranda itself. 86 s.ct. at 
1627. State v. Workmen, 20 Utah 2d 178, 435 P.2d 919 
(1968), reversed per curiam 393 U.S. 21, is clearly 
distinguishable from the instant case. In '"ork~ V'• , •. ,en I SUpra, 
the defendant ·~as not advised of his right to have an attorne" 
'I 
appointed if he could not afford one. This was one of the 
elements which the Supreme Court stated in Miranda to be 
mandatory. 86 S.Ct. at 1627. Respondent asserts that oo 
Miranda violation occurred in the instant case. 
POINT IV 
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE MIRANDA 
WARUING WAS NOT TIMELY GIVEN, THE 
ADMISSION OF THE VOLUNTARY STATEMENT 
IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence, states: 
"A verdict or finding shall not be 
set aside nor shall the judgment or 
decision thereon be reversed, by 
reason of the erroneous admission of 
evidence unless . (b) the court 
which passes upon the effect of the 
error or errors is of the opinion 
that the admitted evidence should have 
been excluded on the ground stated 
and probably had a substantial in-
fluence in bringing about th~ 
verdict or finding .•. " 
This court has on numerous occasions pointed out 
that "it will not reverse criminal cases for mere error or 
-16-
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r 
1. 
irregularity." State v. Neal, 1 Utah 2d 122, 262 P.2d 75 6 
(1953). Section 77-42-1, Utah Code Ann., (1953) states in 
part: 
"If error has been committed, 
it shall not be presumed to have 
resulted in prejudice. The court must 
be satisfied that it has that effect 
before it is warranted in reversing 
the judgment." 
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), considered 
the problem resulting from an error at trial involving a 
right protected by the federal constitution. 
"We are urged by petitioners 
to hold that all federal constitutional 
errors, regardless of facts and 
circumstances, must always be deemed 
harmful. We decline to adopt 
any such rule." 386 U.S. at 21-22. 
In a Tenth Circuit case, Chase v. Crisp, 523 F.2d 
595 (Ca. 10 1975), cer~. denied, 424 U.S. 947, the court 
analyzed the Chapman test of "harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt," and noted that in light of Harrington v. California, 
395 U.S. 250 (1969), the Supreme Court had not held that 
a "departure from constitutional procedures should result in 
an automatic reversal." 523 F.2d at 598. The Tenth Circuit 
also addressed the problem of determining the effect of the 
improper evidence on the jury and said: 
"We must focus on its probable 
impact upon the minds of 'an average 
jury.' 'Our judgment must be based 
upon our own reading of the record and 
on what seems to us to have been the 
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probable impact . . . (of the 
ina~nissitle evidence} on the minds 
of the average jury. Harrington, 
supra.'" 523 F.2d ."'It 5<:18. 
The court also compared the weight of the properly admitt~ 
evidence to that of the inadmissible evidence. 
Assuming, _arguendo, that the testimony ::-eg2rding 
the appellant's dee lara tion was il".lproperly admitted in this 
case, there was still adequate evidence to convince the 
reasonable juror of the appellant's guilt. Apart from the 
challenged testimony, the State offered evidence of the 
paraphernalia found in the appellant's home (T. 14, 15, 18 ,21, 
24,25,26,27,28) and of the al".lount and quality of the heroin 
found (T. 96, 101). The State also offered evidence of 
the street value of the heroin (T. 165,166), and of the 
appellant's and his spouse's income (T. 164,176). In 
addition, the State introduced testimony in regards to the 
difficulty of purchasing a sizeable amount of heroin in 
Salt Lake City, and the appellant's own witness testified 
that the most heroin he was able to buy at the time in 
question was "two spoons," (T. 135), a small quantity. 
It is clear that an error puroorted to affect 
constitutional rights does not require automatic reversal. 
In addition, unless the trial court's determination of 
admissibility is shown to be clearly erroneous, the Supreme 
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Court should not reverse. No such showing has been made. 
CONCLUSION 
Because appellant was advised timely of his 
Miranda rights, the testimony of Deputy George (T. 35) 
relating the appellant's statement was properly admitted at 
trial. Even if the Miranda warning was not properly given, 
the statement is admissible as a voluntary, spontaneous 
declaration. If this Court finds that the statement was 
improperly admitted, respondent submits that in light of 
the other evidence presented at trial, admission of the 
statement does not rise to the level of reversible error. 
Appellant's second claim, that the Miranda warning 
he received was incomplete, is uithout merit. There is no 
case law to support his contention, and he offers no evidence 
to show that this right to cut off questioning was not 
"scrupulously honored." 
In light of the foregoing reasoning and 
authority, respondent urges this Court to affirm the decision 
of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys fc•r Re.spondent 
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